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I. INTRODUCTION
Aggregations of economic power typically create the opportunity
for mischief. 1 At times, the magnitude of harm is so high that it simply
is not worth the risk of allowing such aggregations to form at all. 2 The
antitrust laws, however, cannot condemn every consolidation of market
power or wealth, since often, the prospect of gaining market dominance
drives firms to compete and innovate. 3
Given the broad and
prophylactic nature of the language employed in the antitrust statutes, 4
courts need a method of parsing pernicious aggregations of economic
power from benign ones. 5 The antitrust injury doctrine performs this
function. 6
1. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1051, 1051 (1979).
It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in
interpreting the antitrust laws. By ‘political values,’ I mean, first, a fear that excessive
concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and
second, a desire to enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range
within which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare
of all.

Id.
2. The antitrust laws are frequently described as addressing anticompetitive
conduct in its incipiency. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 63-698, at 1 (1914) (noting that the
antitrust laws are meant to target anticompetitive conduct in its nascent stage); see also
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (“[S]ection 7 was intended . . .
to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their ‘incipiency.’”).
3. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.
The opportunity to charge monopoly prices – at least for a short period – is what
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth.

Id.
4. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978) (noting that the
broad scope of the provision counsels in favor of expansive interpretation of the
language in the Clayton Act); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (“The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may
be perpetrated.”).
5. Courts typically condemn “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly
power] as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
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The antitrust injury requirement is an integral part of the antitrust
standing inquiry. 7 While antitrust standing determines whether the
correct plaintiff is before the court, the antitrust injury doctrine ensures
that injuries redressed by the Clayton Act are injuries against which the
antitrust laws were meant to protect. 8 Section 4 of the Clayton Act 9
enables an injured plaintiff to seek treble damages, 10 while section 16 of
the Clayton Act allows a plaintiff to enjoin a transaction that threatens to
inflict antitrust injury on the plaintiff’s business. 11
When a court must decide whether to enjoin a transaction before the
manifestation of any impermissible anticompetitive effects, it must
determine the likelihood of such conduct with limited information. 12
Often, a court will have information about a firm’s market share in the
relevant market. 13 Given a firm with a large market share, however, a
court must still make several assumptions about the firm and the
relevant market to ascertain whether the firm will abuse its dominant
position. 14
A court must not only assess the likelihood of
anticompetitive conduct before it has occurred, but also the likelihood
that the anticompetitive conduct will inflict an injury on the plaintiff that
the antitrust laws were meant to prevent. 15
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
6. Cf. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Who Suffered Antitrust Injury in the
Microsoft Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 836 (2001) (explaining that the
calculation of damages under the antitrust injury doctrine must accurately reflect the
harm caused by the anticompetitive conduct alone, and not damages caused by
legitimate competitive behavior). Additionally, if any benefit was obtained, it must be
subtracted from the damage calculation. See id.
7. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986) (“A
showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establishing
standing under § 4 . . . .”).
8. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
10. Id. (“Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained . . . .”).
11. See id. § 26 (“Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to
sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . .
. .”).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
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The Second Circuit’s opinion in R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever
N.V. offers a notable example of a court presuming antitrust injury and
enjoining a merger. The court held that market share data could be used
to infer a threat of antitrust injury for the purposes of section 16 of the
Clayton Act. 17 Using market share data to presume the threat of
antitrust injury, as in R.C. Bigelow, a court assumes the ability of the
parties to abuse their market power. There are two reasons why
presuming antitrust injury can be problematic. First, the antitrust injury
requirement, as a filtering doctrine, is part of the standing inquiry.
Courts should use the standing inquiry to focus on whether the plaintiff
is the appropriate party to bring an antitrust case, rather than to decide
the merits of a case. 18 Second, factors in addition to market share, such
as barriers to entry in the relevant market, may determine whether a firm
benefits from anticompetitive conduct. 19 For example, firms are
unlikely to engage in predatory pricing 20 —the act of pricing goods
16

16.
17.
18.

867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 108.
See Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301,
305 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A]ntitrust injury for standing purposes should be viewed from
the perspective of the plaintiff’s position in the marketplace, not from the merits-related
perspective of the impact of a defendant’s conduct on overall competition.”).
19. This principle reveals itself through a court’s typical method of market
analysis. To determine whether a sub-market exists within a larger market, the smaller
market must be insulated from entry to the extent that it forms its own self-contained
market. For example, in FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997), the
court considered whether the relevant market encompassed every store that sold office
supplies, or only superstores that sold office supplies. The court examined the effect of
price competition between the two markets and determined that only superstore pricing
affects other superstore prices. Id. at 1079-80. The court also noted that other large
stores that attempted to expand into office supplies were unsuccessful. Id. at 1086-88.
This line of reasoning demonstrates a need to define a market by its boundaries; that is,
whether others can easily enter. See generally United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743
F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (resting on the assumption that if firms could enter the submarket profitably, they would); United States v. Calamar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298
(D.N.J. 1985).
20. Most scholars agree that predatory pricing is the pricing of goods below some
measure of cost. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699
(1975); Laura Ferrari Bravo & Paolo Siciliani, Exclusionary Pricing and Consumer
Harm: The European Commission’s Practice in the DSL Market, 3 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 243, 258 (2007); Albert A. Foer, Mr. Magoo Visits Wal-Mart: Finding the
Right Lens for Antitrust, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1307, 1319 (2007) (“The illegal act of
predatory pricing is defined as setting one’s prices below an appropriate measure of
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below cost to capture market share—due to the difficulty of recouping
losses sustained on the goods sold. The firm must simultaneously ward
off the entry of competitors into the market to recoup the costs of
predatory pricing. 21 In addition, courts struggle to define predatory
pricing and measure the appropriate cost, 22 thus making a presumption
of predatory conduct based solely on market share even less tenable.
Rather than presume antitrust injury, a court must judge every form
of conduct according to its probability of anticompetitive harm. Each
set of facts warrants its own individualized inquiry. Jurisprudence free
of presumptions will ensure that the court will not make unjustified
inferences about the defendant or the relevant market.
II. THE ANTITRUST INJURY REQUIREMENT
In addition to meeting Article III standing, 23 which requires a
plaintiff to establish a judicially cognizable case or controversy, 24 an
antitrust plaintiff must also show antitrust standing to sue for treble
damages or injunctive relief. 25 To have standing, a plaintiff must suffer
an antitrust injury, which is an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent.” 26 This requirement is most likely a means of
limiting the broad standing provision of section 4 of the Clayton Act,27
which states that “any person who shall be injured in his business or
cost, with the ability to later raise prices sufficiently to recapture the investment made in
below-cost pricing.”).
21. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589
(1986) (“The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly
power for long enough both to recoup the predator’s losses and to harvest some
additional gain.”).
22. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
23. U.S. CONST. art. III.
24. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“A plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely
to be redressed by the requested relief.”).
25. See Cargill, Inc., v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986) (noting
that antitrust standing and antitrust injury are required for standing for injunctive relief
under section 16 of the Clayton Act); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
482 (1982) (noting that antitrust injury is required for standing under the treble damages
provision of the Clayton Act).
26. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). The Clayton Act contains many of the remedial
provisions for the antitrust laws. In particular, the treble damages and injunction
provisions are found in sections 15 and 26, respectively, of the Clayton Act.
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property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . .
. .” 28 Narrowing the Clayton Act’s broad standing provision increases
the likelihood that the proper plaintiff will bring suit, rather than a party
injured by the ripple effects of anticompetitive conduct. 29
The language of the Clayton Act does suggest a broader
interpretation without limiting doctrines like antitrust standing or
injury. 30 In fact, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he unrestrictive
language of the section, and the avowed breadth of the congressional
purpose, cautions [against cabining] § 4 in ways that will defeat its
broad remedial objective.” 31 Nevertheless, the prospect of allowing any
individual to sue for harms they suffer from the mere ripple effects of
anticompetitive behavior would be repugnant to the spirit of Article III
of the Constitution, 32 which grants jurisdiction over discrete cases and
controversies, and bars suits based on generalized grievances.
The Supreme Court has struggled to balance the opposing forces
implicit in the Clayton Act. 33 On one hand, the Court must prevent the

28. Id. The antitrust injury requirement also applies to section 16 of the Clayton
Act, which empowers a court to hear cases for injunctive relief. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at
122.
29. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 476-77.
30. Id. at 477.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 476-77 (“An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm
to flow through the Nation’s economy; but despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a
point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming
only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution
and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it
does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.

Id.; see also ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 616 (1989) (“[G]eneralized
grievances brought by concerned citizens . . . are not cognizable in the federal courts.”);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only
that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.

Id.
33. The Supreme Court has interpreted portions of the Clayton Act expansively in
light of the broad language used by Congress. For example, the Supreme Court in
Pfizer Inc. v. Gov’t of India, held that “any person” included a foreign sovereign. 434
U.S. 308, 313-14 (1978). In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Court interpreted the phrase
“property” broadly because of the statute’s broad language and remedial purpose. 442
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provision from becoming a means of litigating generalized grievances
and attenuated injuries. 34 On the other hand, the Court must give full
effect to Congress’ remedial intent. 35 Because of this need to balance,
the antitrust standing doctrine incorporates the notion of antitrust injury
to limit the class of injuries that are actionable under the statute. 36
Certain injuries standing alone, such as an increase in prices, might not
be enough for antitrust injury purposes. 37 The antitrust injury analysis
requires that courts examine the injury sustained, the purpose of the
antitrust laws creating the cause of action, and the causal link between
the two. 38
A. What the Antitrust Law were Meant to Protect Against: Early
Supreme Court Decisions
To determine whether an antitrust injury exists, one must
understand what protections antitrust laws were meant to afford. The
U.S. 330, 338 (1979). The Court has also noted that the statute should not be construed
to allow any person to recover for the ripple effects of anti-competitive behavior. See
McCready, 457 U.S. at 465.
34. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983) (noting that while Article III standing ensures that the
plaintiff has been injured, antitrust injury goes further by ensuring that the proper
plaintiff is before the court).
35. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 331 n.1 (1990)
(“Section 4 of the Clayton Act is a remedial provision that makes available treble
damages to ‘any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.’”); see also Matthew R. Dorsett, Diamonds Are
a Cartel’s Best Friend: The Rise and Fall of Anticompetitive Business Practices Within
De Beers’s International Diamond Cartel, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 162
n.158 (“The Clayton Act also contains the primary remedial provisions of the antitrust
laws.”).
36. See Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust
Injury: Down the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273,
295 (1998) (noting that antitrust injury facilitates a standing inquiry that limits the class
of plaintiffs that can sue to those within the “zone of interests” of the antitrust laws).
37. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 n.10
(1977) (holding that the acquisition of bowling allies that would have gone out of
business if not acquired did not confer standing on the plaintiffs because the injury did
not result from a lessening of competition, but from the maintenance of competitive
levels).
38. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535 (noting that
proximate cause is the crux of the standing analysis and that courts have often resolved
such issues with common law causation doctrines).
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scope of standing under the antitrust laws changes when viewed as a
means of maximizing economic efficiency, rather than as a vehicle to
favor small business over large conglomerates, or to protect the end
consumer. 39 If courts focus on promoting efficiency, then market
inefficiencies can give rise to suit under the Clayton Act’s injunctive
relief and trebling provisions. 40 However, under a small business
protection rationale, a transaction beyond a certain size could
sufficiently threaten small business to warrant judicial intervention. 41
Likewise, under the consumer protection model, parties all the way
down the vertical supply chain could have standing to sue, creating the
threat of duplicative recovery. 42 Not only could ultimate consumers sue
due to the higher price forced upon them by anti-competitive conduct,
middlemen could sue, too. 43
No single policy successfully encapsulates the purposes of the
antitrust laws. 44 Economic efficiency is certainly a large part of the

39. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 720c
(1978); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
386-87 (Basic Books 1978).
40. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.3b (3d ed. 2005).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-73 (1966)
(holding that a 7.5% market share was adequate to condemn a grocery store merger
under section 7 of the Clayton Act); see also id. at 283-84 (“Another, more generalized,
congressional purpose revealed by the legislative history was to protect small
businessmen and to stem the rising tide of concentration in the economy.”).
42. See Ill. Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (rejecting the offensive use of
“passing on” theory); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968) (rejecting a “passing on” defense).
43. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 737.
Permitting the use of pass-on theories under § 4 essentially would transform trebledamages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential
plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge—from direct purchasers to
middlemen to ultimate consumers. However appealing this attempt to allocate the
overcharge might seem in theory, it would add whole new dimensions of complexity
to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness.

Id.
44. See BORK, supra note 39, at 427 (stating that the antitrust laws have been
justified as a means of promoting consumer welfare); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 27 (2d ed. 2001) (expressing that the antitrust laws are also a means of ensuring
economically efficient markets); Richard M. Brunell, The Social Costs of Mergers:
Restoring “Local Control” as a Factor in Merger Policy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 149, 193-94
(2006) (asserting that, to some extent, the antitrust laws probably reflect an attempt to
accomplish several regulatory goals).
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statutory scheme, but so is consumer protection. Nevertheless, a court
must first determine whether the antitrust laws are meant to shield the
party from the injury they sustained. 45 Often, a consumer protection
approach gives rise to the threat of duplicative recovery,46 while the
economic efficiency rationale gives rise to the possibility of remedying
attenuated injuries dispersed throughout the entire economy. 47 Rather
than elucidate what the antitrust laws mean in every case, the Supreme
Court applies a case by case approach. 48
Two Supreme Court decisions elaborate what the antitrust laws
were meant to prevent within the context of the antitrust injury
requirement: Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 49 and Blue
Shield of Virginia v. McCready. 50 The two cases, taken together, present
two underlying principles of the antitrust injury requirement. First, the
antitrust laws are not meant to shield a party from competition. 51
Second, the antitrust laws are meant to redress injuries resulting from
anticompetitive behavior. 52 The simultaneous need to redress injury and
foster competition have forced the court to focus on the causal nexus
between the purpose of the antitrust laws and the injury asserted to
determine whether antitrust injury exists.

45. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (“Instead,
a plaintiff must prove the existence of antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977))).
46. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14 (1972) (“Measurement
of an injury to the general economy, on the other hand, necessarily involves an
examination of the impact of a restraint of trade upon every variable that affects the
State’s economic health—a task extremely difficult ‘in the real economic world rather
than an economist’s hypothetical model.’”).
47. See id. In other contexts, injuries dispersed across the national economy pose
similar remedial problems. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 489.
48. See Ronald W. Davis, Standing On Shaky Ground: The Strangely Elusive
Doctrine of Antitrust Injury, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 758 (“Prudence might well
indicate that it is best to proceed on a case-by-case basis, eschewing for the moment this
particular generalization about antitrust injury.”). Cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
49. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
50. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
51. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
52. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 472.
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1. Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat: The Antitrust Laws Do Not
Protect Against the Forces of Competition
The Brunswick decision was one of the first Supreme Court cases to
announce the rule that the injury sustained must be of a type that the
antitrust laws were meant to prevent. 53 Further, Brunswick stands for
the proposition that injury-in-fact resulting from competitive forces is,
by itself, never sufficient to meet the antitrust injury requirement. 54
In Brunswick, the Court dealt with a merger that was the product of
a sharp decline in the bowling industry. 55 Brunswick was one of the two
largest producers of bowling equipment. 56 The bowling centers to
whom Brunswick sold equipment began to suffer from an industry-wide
decline. 57 As a result, Brunswick could either foreclose on the bowling
equipment it had sold to the bowling centers, or it could buy out the
bowling centers and operate them to recoup the debt. 58 Naturally,
Brunswick chose the latter. 59 After all, there would not be much of a
market for repossessed bowling equipment in the midst of an industry
slump.
A competing company that operated bowling centers brought suit,
claiming that the acquisitions violated section 7 of the Clayton Act,60
and sued for both treble damages under section 4 61 and injunctive relief
under section 16 of the Act. 62 The Third Circuit sided with the
plaintiffs, 63 noting that if the bowling centers were not acquired by
Brunswick they would have gone out of business, allowing the
competing bowling alleys a greater share of the market. 64

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
See id. at 488.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 480.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
Id. § 16.
Id. § 26; Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 480-81.
See NBO Indus. Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 272-73 (3d
Cir. 1975).
64. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 482-84; see also NBO Indus. Treadway, 523 F.2d at
272-73.
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The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Third Circuit’s
“holding divorces antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust
laws without a clear statutory command to do so.” 65 In particular, the
Court recognized that every merger would force certain economic
readjustments, which under the Third Circuit’s reasoning would make
virtually every causally related injury actionable, 66 even injuries that the
antitrust laws were not meant to prevent. 67 The Court continued, noting
that the antitrust laws only condemn mergers “when they may produce
anticompetitive effects.” 68 The Third Circuit requires only a showing
that the plaintiffs are worse off after the merger. 69 This means all
injuries resulting from the merger would be actionable, regardless of the
reasons for condemning the merger. 70 In the Court’s words, such a rule
would make recovery “entirely fortuitous, and would authorize damages
for losses which are of no concern to the antitrust laws.” 71
Applied to the facts of the Brunswick case, the injury sustained by
the plaintiffs would not be enough to bring an action under the remedial
provisions of the antitrust laws. 72 The plaintiff asserted that Brunswick
prevented the bowling centers from going out of business, in essence
precluding the plaintiffs from expanding their market share by virtue of
less competition. 73 Justice Marshall, writing for the Brunswick court,
summarized that “it is quite clear that if respondents were injured, it was
not ‘by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws’: while [the]
loss occurred ‘by reason of’ the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur
‘by reason of’ that which made the acquisitions unlawful.” 74 Thus, the
merger itself might have been an unlawful attempt to monopolize the
industry, and the injury to the competing bowling centers might have
65.
66.
67.

Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487.
Id.
Id. (“[U]nder the Court of Appeals’ holding, once a merger is found to violate §
7, all dislocations caused by the merger are actionable, regardless of whether those
dislocations have anything to do with the reason the merger was condemned.”).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 489 (“We therefore hold that [for] the plaintiffs to recover treble
damages on account of § 7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked
to an illegal presence in the market.”).
73. See id. at 488 (“The damages respondents obtained are designed to provide
them with the profits they would have realized had competition been reduced.”).
74. Id. at 488.
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been causally related, but the injury was not sustained because of an
effect that the antitrust laws were meant to prevent; the injury was the
effect of an increase in competition. 75
2. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready: The Antitrust Laws Redress
Anticompetitive Harm
While the Brunswick decision stands for the proposition that the
antitrust laws are not meant to insulate competitors from competition,
the McCready decision stands for the Clayton Act’s broad remedial
purpose. 76 Blue Shield, the defendant in that case, would only
reimburse patients for psychotherapy administered by a psychiatrist, 77
but not by a psychologist, unless billed through a physician.78
McCready, a patient, was denied reimbursement for psychotherapy
administered by a psychologist and brought a class action suit against
the insurance provider, alleging an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 79 The Sherman Act prohibits
parties from entering into relationships that unreasonably restrain
trade. 80 To redress the Sherman Act claims, the plaintiffs sought treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 81
After the district court held that McCready lacked standing,82 the
Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. 83 The Supreme Court affirmed,
and in doing so noted the broad remedial purpose of the Clayton Act’s
treble damages provision. 84 The Act protected “all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated.” 85 The Court also noted that “[a]n antitrust violation may
be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow through the Nation’s

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1982).
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id. at 468-70.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States”).
81. Id. § 15.
82. See McCready v. Blue Shield of Va., 649 F.2d 228, 230 (4th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 232.
84. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
85. Id.
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economy; but despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a point beyond
which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.” 86
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately predicated its holding that
McCready had standing on the remedial purpose of the Clayton Act. 87
Although individuals should not be permitted to bring suit for injuries
sustained by the economy as a whole, 88 a plaintiff need not wait until
driven from the market before suing. 89 The Court concluded that it was
“unable to identify any persuasive rationale upon which McCready
might be denied redress under § 4 for the injury she claims.” 90
In upholding McCready’s standing, the Court rejected the argument
that since McCready’s employers paid for the insurance, not McCready,
the plaintiff had no standing. 91 Although McCready was not a
competitor, the injury suffered was inextricably intertwined with the
anticompetitive conduct. 92 That is, the insurance company inflicted its
injury on the psychologist by denying reimbursement to the patient. 93
The McCready case provides important insight into the nature of
the antitrust injury inquiry. Three principles are at work: the purpose of
the antitrust laws, the need to remedy injuries, and the causal nexus
between the injury and the antitrust laws. If any one of these policies is
evoked to a greater extent than another, a court will find antitrust injury.
In McCready, two principles were quite pronounced. First, the patients
denied reimbursement demonstrated sufficient need to remedy the
injuries they sustained. 94 Second, the health care providers violated
antitrust law by denying the patients’ reimbursement claims. 95 The
policies of remedying causally air-tight injuries became more important
than abstract pronouncements about what the antitrust laws were meant
to prevent.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 476-77.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 482 (“Indeed, as we made clear in a footnote to the relied-upon passage, a
§ 4 plaintiff need not ‘prove an actual lessening of competition in order to recover.
[Competitors] may be able to prove antitrust injury before they actually are driven from
the market and competition is thereby lessened.’” (citation omitted)).
90. Id. at 485.
91. Id. at 480-81.
92. See id. at 484.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 484-85.
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B. The Rule that Emerges
Brunswick underscores that antitrust laws are not intended to
insulate competitors from the forces of competition, 96 while McCready
demonstrates the importance of the Clayton Act’s remedial purpose and
the importance of the causal nexus between the policies behind the act
and the injury sustained. 97 In the aggregate, the antitrust injury
requirement ensures that standing is not conferred on too broad a class;
that is, it is not conferred on a class of individuals that are only injured
by the (sometimes brutal) forces of competition.
The antitrust laws do have an important remedial purpose. 98
Although a narrow standing doctrine ensures that courts are not
overburdened by dockets full of claims for the redress of attenuated
injuries predicated on the ripples of generalized economic harm, a court
should not lose sight of its purpose: to vindicate rights and to redress
injury. 99 Regardless of whether the purpose of the antitrust laws is
economic efficiency or consumer protection, federal claims must
implicate concrete cases and controversies. McCready makes it clear
that where an injury is so causally related to the breach of the antitrust
laws, it must be redressed, and the antitrust laws must be interpreted to
remedy such injuries. 100

96. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (“The
damages respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the profits they would
have realized had competition been reduced. The antitrust laws, however, were enacted
for ‘the protection of competition not competitors.’”) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
97. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 477 (“[T]he unrestrictive language of the section,
and the avowed breadth of the congressional purpose, cautions us not to cabin § 4 in
ways that will defeat its broad remedial objective.”).
98. See id.
99. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (noting that indirect harm does
not necessarily preclude an individual from standing); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.”).
100. See, e.g., McCready, 457 U.S. at 477.
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C. The Antitrust Injury Requirement and Section 16 of the Clayton Act
Many of the cases discussing the antitrust injury requirement
involve treble damage actions under section 4 of the Clayton Act.101
Private enforcement is integral to a court’s ability to invoke equitable
power and enjoin a potentially anticompetitive transaction. 102 Thus,
section 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes a court to grant injunctive relief
to “any person, firm, corporation, or association” 103 to remedy
“threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . .” 104
The breadth of the provision’s language is as staggering as the treble
damage provision in section 4, which states that “any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue . . . .” 105
However, notable differences exist between the language of section
16 and section 4 that may make the antitrust injury requirement slightly
different. Most notably, section 16 talks of “threatened loss or
damage,” 106 while section 4 does not. 107 Section 4 recognizes injuries to
“business or property,” 108 but section 16 makes no such qualification.109
These differences point to the possibility that the remedial scope of
section 16 might be broader. However, the scope of section 4 is, on its
face, broader than section 16 because section 4 allows suit for “anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws.” 110 If section 4 lends sanction to broad
remedial interpretations of the provision, 111 then the absence of such a
provision in section 16 may imply that a tighter causal nexus is required
for injunctive relief than for treble damages. Ultimately, the differences
101. See Jonathan L. Disenhaus, Competitor Standing to Challenge a Merger of
Rivals: The Applicability Of Strategic Behavior Analysis, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2057, 2057
(1987) (“Few private plaintiffs sought to enjoin illegal mergers through the standing
granted them by section 16 of the Clayton Act.”).
102. See id. at 2058-59.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 15.
106. Id. § 26.
107. See id. § 15.
108. Id.
109. See id. § 26.
110. Id. § 15.
111. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (noting the
broad remedial purpose of the Clayton Act); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977) (noting that the injury must be of the type the
antitrust laws were meant to protect against).
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are not determinative, and it is difficult to conclude which provision
merits broader construction.
Ignoring the textual differences between the provisions, the
Supreme Court has held that both sections 16 and 4 require antitrust
injury. 112 Courts, however, have interpreted section 16 more broadly
than section 4 by allowing suit for injunctive relief for anticompetitive
conduct that has simply threatened loss or injury, absent actual injury. 113
That section 16 has no business or property qualification, as in section 4,
bolsters this interpretation, implying that threatened injury need not
manifest itself as actual injury before a court can hear a case for
injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court faced the issue of parity between sections 4 and
16 in Cargill, Inc., v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 114 The fifth largest beef
packer, Monfort, 115 brought suit to enjoin a merger between two of its
competitors, the second and third largest meat packers in the market. 116
Monfort brought suit under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 117 alleging
that if the merger was consummated it would violate section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 118 which prohibits mergers that substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly. 119
Monfort theorized that the size of the merged entity would allow it
to engage in a “price-cost squeeze.” 120 By lowering prices to cost or just
above cost, a competitor’s profit margins would fall, slowly driving the
competitor out of business. 121 Monfort conceded that its “operations
were as efficient as those [of its merging competitors and that] only
below-cost pricing could remove Monfort as an obstacle.” 122 The Court

112. See Cargill, Inc., v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986) (“We hold
that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act must show a
threat of antitrust injury, and that a showing of loss or damage due to merely increased
competition does not constitute such injury.”).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 111.
115. Id. at 106.
116. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006).
118. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 107.
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
120. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 108.
121. See id. at 114-15.
122. Id. at 115 n.10.
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used this concession to conclude that absent an allegation of below-cost
pricing, Monfort would not sustain antitrust injury. 123
The Court then turned to whether Excel, the surviving competitor
after the companies merged, engaged or was likely to engage in
predatory pricing. 124 The Court defined predatory pricing as “pricing
below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating
competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the long
run.” 125 Noting the pernicious effect of predatory pricing, 126 the Court
scoured the record for an allegation of the practice and found none,
leading to a reversal of the Second Circuit’s contrary decision. 127
In Cargill, the Supreme Court resolved whether the antitrust injury
requirement extended to injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton
Act. 128 The Court, confronting the issue of granting injunctive relief
based on speculative claims of injury that may result from post-merger
actions, 129 weighed the risk of frustrating competition against the
possibility of an anticompetitive transaction. 130 The Court rejoined that
it would make little sense to deny a party standing to challenge a
transaction just because the anticompetitive conduct rarely occurs.131
The likelihood of predatory conduct would largely depend on the
likelihood that the predatory firm could recoup the losses sustained
while engaging in predatory pricing. 132 However, the Court also
recognized that the mechanism a firm would use to engage in predatory
pricing is the same mechanism that a firm would use to compete—they
would lower prices. 133 Although predatory pricing is difficult to
assume, the Court nevertheless refused to deny standing to the plaintiffs
simply because the defendants were unlikely to engage in the
anticompetitive conduct. 134

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id.
See id. at 118-20.
Id. at 117.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 121.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 122 n.17 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 122.
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The Court ultimately held that “a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief
under § 16 of the Clayton Act must show a threat of antitrust injury, and
that a showing of loss or damage due merely to increased competition
does not constitute such injury.” 135 This brought the requirements for
injunctive relief in line with the antitrust injury requirement articulated
by Brunswick and McCready—a causal nexus must exist between the
injury and the purpose of the antitrust laws, and injury sustained from
the effects of competition alone are never enough to confer standing.
D. The Problem With Finding Antitrust Injury Before the
Transaction Is Consummated
Without the benefit of hindsight to assess the causal connection
between an actual injury and the antitrust violation at issue, a court must
speculate about the potential effects of a transaction. 136 Further, the
prophylactic nature of the antitrust laws makes it more difficult to
minimize the speculative analysis. For example, section 7 of the
Clayton Act prohibits mergers that lessen competition or tend to create
monopolies. 137 Acts that focus on stifling competition can also plausibly
point to the natural effects of competitive behavior. 138
In the case of a merger that has not yet been consummated, there is
no surefire way of knowing how a company will use its post-merger
market power. Typically, the threat of antitrust injury will stem from
what a merged entity can do, rather than what it is likely to do. The
potential for anticompetitive behavior becomes the primary means of
evaluating the merits of a section 7 claim. 139 Predatory pricing is a
prime example of behavior in which a merged entity could engage. 140

135.
136.

Id.
See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (“A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature
speculative. Any agreement below the competitive level requires the conspirators to
forgo profits that free competition would offer them.”).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
138. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122 n.17 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589).
139. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1981); Marathon
Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 1981); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar,
535 F. Supp. 933, 945 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
140. See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 62 n.252 (2005) (“Theoretically, consumers could sue for an injunction against
attempted monopolization through predation, but the likelihood that consumers would
seek equitable remedies in cases without damages is remote.”).
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However, firms rarely profit from engaging in below-cost pricing, 141
namely because it may not be economically feasible for the merged
entity to recoup its costs. 142 Nevertheless, plaintiffs will still likely
argue that a defendant will engage in such conduct after it merges.
The Supreme Court, however, has refused to make an inference one
way or the other in its antitrust summary judgment jurisprudence when
the evidence points both ways. 143 When the evidence is “consistent with
permissible competition as [well as] with illegal conspiracy,” 144 a court
cannot “exclude the possibility” 145 that the anticompetitive conduct was
the result of independent action. Likewise, when a court speculates
about what a firm will do after merging, the improbability of predatory
pricing, coupled with the plausibility of competitive conduct using the
same economic mechanism, makes it difficult for a court to assess the
potential consequences of a transaction.
In sum, the antitrust injury requirement becomes difficult to
evaluate before the consummation of a transaction, simply because the
antitrust laws are drafted broadly enough to encapsulate both innocent
and pernicious economic behavior. 146 What differentiates the two is the
injury it inflicts. If the injury has not yet occurred, a court may have a
difficult time distinguishing between what the antitrust laws proscribe
and what is in fact allowed, thus chilling the competitive forces it
intends to foster. 147

141. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699 (noting that formulaic
condemnation of below cost and predatory pricing provides little insight into the effects
and likelihood of such practices).
142. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594-95 (“[P]redatory pricing schemes require
conspirators to suffer losses in order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover,
the gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes more likely to fail
than to succeed.”); BORK, supra note 39, at 149-55.
143. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
144. Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
145. Id.
146. This problem is precisely why summary judgment proceedings in antitrust laws
pose special problems. Courts must make determinations of conspiracy or market
power in violation of antitrust laws without complete information. Moreover, courts
must analyze market behavior that can plausibly be framed as competitive. Thus, courts
have required that the evidence “tends to exclude the possibility” that the economic
behavior was legitimate. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764.
147. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699 (“Extreme care [should] be taken
in formulating [antitrust] rules [on predatory pricing], lest the threat of litigation,
particularly by private parties, materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing.”).
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III. DOES SIZE ALWAYS POSE A THREAT OF ANTITRUST INJURY?
Federal courts have often recognized the threat of consolidated
economic power. 148 They have gone to such great lengths as to favor
small ventures over large ones. 149 Yet, not all aggregations of economic
power should be regarded as a market evil to be extinguished. Since the
prospect of achieving high market share motivates firms to succeed and
innovate, 150 this tension between condemning firms with high market
share and nurturing the incentive to innovate makes defining a rule for
enjoining high-concentration mergers rather difficult. On one hand, the
probability that a merged entity with a controlling market share will
abuse its position, even if miniscule, may be too large a risk when
multiplied by the magnitude of potential harm. On the other hand, a
mechanical rule that enjoins mergers which cause a concentrated market
may create a strain of arbitrariness in antitrust jurisprudence. 151
The problem compounds when private enforcement is involved. A
competitor may have standing to enjoin a merger that concentrates the
merging companies’ market shares, even if such merger poses little risk
148. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (noting that
concentrations of market share are likely to lessen competition); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962) (“Congress saw the process of
concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it sought to assure the Federal
Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this force at its outset and before it
gathered momentum.”); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290,
324 (1897) (“[I]t is not material that the price of an article may be lowered. It is in the
power of the combination to raise it . . . .”).
149. See Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 324.
[I]t is not for the real prosperity of any country that such changes should occur which
result in transferring an independent business man, the head of his establishment,
small though it might be into a mere servant or agent of a corporation for selling
commodities which he once manufactured or dealt in, having no voice in shaping the
business policy of the company and bout to obey orders issued by others.

Id.
150. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004) (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power
will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive
conduct. Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that
renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.”).
151. See Robert F. Nostramo, Re-Opening the Door to Antitrust Standing: R.C.
Bigelow, Inc., v. Unilever N.V., 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 166, 177-78 (1989) (arguing that
the rule counters the trend away from mechanical condemnation of concentration of
economic power in antitrust jurisprudence).
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of abuse. In particular, low barriers to entry may prevent firms with
significant market share from charging monopoly prices. Without
considering the entire market climate, the rule governing injunctions
could mechanically inhibit most mergers.
A. The R.C. Bigelow Rule
In R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 152 the Second Circuit
announced a rule that equates market share to the threat of antitrust
injury. 153 In that case, the merger in question would have bestowed 84%
of the herbal tea market share upon one company. 154 A competitor with
13% of the market share brought suit under section 16 of the Clayton
Act to enjoin the merger, claiming that the merger would violate section
7 of the Clayton Act. 155
The court found the requisite antitrust injury to enjoin the
merger, 156 relying on United States v. Philadelphia National Bank. 157
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in
the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to
lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
158
have such anticompetitive effects.

The court reasoned that firms with a large market concentration
could too easily abuse their power. 159 Thus, the court announced that
the large market share created a presumption that the merger should be
enjoined, 160 and unless the market data painted an inaccurate picture, the
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989).
See Nostramo, supra note 151, at 177-78.
R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 104.
Id.
Id.
374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Id. at 363.
R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 108 (“Whether a proposed merger would
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly is determined through
findings, for example, ‘that the relative size of the acquiring corporation ha[s] increased
to such a point that its advantage over competitors threaten[s] to be ‘decisive.’’”
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 n.36 (1962))); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 81-1191, at 8 (1950).
160. R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 108 (“While market share data alone does not create
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presumption would stand. 161 The court cited potential for abuse and
damage to the market in holding that such mergers should be
enjoined. 162 The rule articulated by the R.C. Bigelow court essentially
stipulated that undue market share automatically confers the required
antitrust injury to support a competitor’s standing. 163
The R.C. Bigelow court purported to apply the Cargill test, which
issues a section 16 injunction only after a showing of threatened antitrust
injury. 164 However, condemning mergers simply because of size runs
counter to the prevalent stance taken by other federal courts. The Fifth
Circuit, for example, expressed that “the notion that merely facing the
specter of a monopoly is enough to create standing in a competitor is not
the law,” 165 using Cargill as the basis for its proposition that market
concentration alone was not enough to confer standing. 166
Many other courts agree with the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of
Cargill, 167 mainly because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 168 which held that the per se
illegality of an offense alone did not create a presumption of antitrust
injury. 169 In Atlantic Richfield, the Court held that even a horizontal

an irrebutable presumption of illegality . . . such a presumption can be overcome only
by evidence that the market share data gives an ‘inaccurate account of the
acquisition[‘s] probable effects on competition.’” (quoting United States v. Citizens &
S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975))).
161. See id. (“[U]nless defendants meet their burden of rebutting this presumption,
the merger must be enjoined.”).
162. Id. (citing Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363).
163. See Nostramo, supra note 151, at 177-78 (“By equating a substantial market
share with a threat of antitrust injury, the R.C. Bigelow court has reverted back to the
mechanical rules thought to have been finally eliminated by Cargill.”).
164. See R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 109-10.
165. Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1988).
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1167
(W.D. Ark. 1995) (rejecting R.C. Bigelow as contrary to Supreme Court precedent);
O.K. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 819 F. Supp. 771, 791 (S.D. Ind.
1992) (noting that the reasoning in R.C. Bigelow conflicts with a subsequent Supreme
Court decision that refused to presume antitrust injury based on the per se illegality of
the alleged conduct).
168. 495 U.S. 328, 342-43 (1990); see also Cmty. Publishers, 892 F. Supp. at 1167
(“No violation of the antitrust laws, even if per se or presumptive, can ever create a
presumption of antitrust injury. This point was made clear by the Supreme Court in
Atlantic Richfield Co . . . .”).
169. See Cmty. Publishers, 892 F. Supp. at 1167-68.
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price fixing scheme, 170 which has been classified as a “hardcore
offense,” 171 was not enough to create a presumption of antitrust
injury. 172 Instead, the Atlantic Richfield Court requires that each
plaintiff show that it has sustained an injury of the type that the antitrust
laws were meant to prevent, and that the injury flows from conduct that
violates those laws. 173 Thus, a position that presumes that a merger
poses a threat of antitrust injury, just by examining the resultant market
share, is a presumption of the sort the Supreme Court in Atlantic
Richfield disavowed. 174
Many courts began to interpret the R.C Bigelow case as creating a
presumption of illegality, pitting the Second Circuit’s decision against
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Atlantic Richfield. 175 Even courts within
the Second Circuit were forced to choose between following the R.C.
Bigelow decision or the Supreme Court. In Remington Products, Inc. v.

170. Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 340. A horizontal price fixing scheme is when two
competitors agree to fix prices or restrict output.
171. See Margaret Bloom, The U.S. and E.U. Move Towards Substantial Antitrust
Convergence on Consumer Welfare Based Enforcement, 19 ANTITRUST 18, 19 (2005)
(“Hardcore restrictions, such as price fixing, output limitation, and allocation of markets
or customers, are almost always prohibited, irrespective of the parties’ market power.”);
Jeremy M. Suhr, Keeping the Door Ajar for Foreign Plaintiffs in Global Cartel Cases
after Empagran, 105 MICH. L. REV. 779, 784 n.38 (2007) (“Although national
competition laws certainly differ in many respects, prohibitions against price-fixing and
‘hardcore’ cartels are nearly universal.”); Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual
Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A Trips Perspective, 7 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 401, 422 (2004) (noting that price fixing is a hardcore antitrust offense).
172. See Jacobson & Greer, supra note 36, at 282-83 (“As the Court explained in
ARCO [Atlantic Richfield], irrespective of the substantive theory, a plaintiff can recover
only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s
behavior.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 344)).
173. See Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 341-42.
We also reject respondent’s suggestion that no antitrust injury need be shown where a
per se violation is involved. The per se rule is a method of determining whether § 1 of
the Sherman Act has been violated, but it does not indicate whether a private plaintiff
has suffered antitrust injury and thus whether he may recover damages under § 4 of
the Clayton Act.

Id.
174.
175.

See id.
See, e.g., Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 717 F. Supp. 36, 49
(D. Conn. 1989) (“In the instant case it appears that NAPC controlled 55% of the
electric shaver industry subsequent to the merger. Although this is not as high as the
market share in Bigelow, it is sufficient to establish a presumption of illegality.”).
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North American Philips Corp., 176 for example, the court indicated that
Atlantic Richfield called into question the R.C. Bigelow court’s
reasoning. In holding that the injury asserted in Remington stemmed
from an increase in competition rather than from a violation of section 7
of the Clayton Act, the court essentially ignored the Second Circuit’s
emphasis on market share. 177
B. An Alternative Interpretation of Cargill
Courts that differ with the R.C. Bigelow approach take a more
stringent position toward the threshold required for injunctive relief.
Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 178 offers a prime example. The
Fifth Circuit noted two possible approaches to the merger injunction
problem. 179 It could either focus on the defendant’s past to determine if
the merged firm would engage in anticompetitive behavior, or it could
assume that the defendant would engage in anticompetitive behavior
simply because it is in a position to do so. 180 The latter approach
corresponds to the rule in R.C. Bigelow.
The Fifth Circuit chose not to assume how the merged entity would
behave after the merger. 181 Instead, the Phototron court interpreted
Cargill conservatively, noting that standing would only exist if the
plaintiffs established that the defendant engaged in predatory pricing. 182
Under the Phototron approach, Cargill limits a plaintiff’s ability to seek
an injunction before suffering harm to cases where monopolistic intent is
clearly inferable. 183 Requiring predatory pricing ensures that the court
does not enjoin a false positive, namely because the predatory pricing
immediately parses high market share cases from monopolization
cases. 184
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

755 F. Supp. 52, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1991).
Id.
842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 99.
Id.
See id. at 100 (“[T]he notion that merely facing the specter of a monopoly is
enough to create standing in a competitor is not the law.”).
182. Id. at 102 (“[C]ompetitors must now supply evidence of predatory behavior
demonstrating a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will be injured.”).
183. See id. at 100.
184. High market share may be the benign result of producing a superior product or
taking advantage of efficiencies unavailable to other competitors. See United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1996) (“[Plaintiff must show] the willful
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The plaintiff, Phototron, argued that Kodak operated its wholesale
facilities at substantially reduced profit margins, if not below cost.185
Phototron argued that if it sold its goods at the same price, it could not
make a profit. 186 This argument assumes that the costs for the two firms
were equal, 187 a presumption rejected by the Fifth Circuit. 188 Instead,
the court held that the plaintiffs must show that the defendants sold
below its own costs, not below the plaintiff’s costs. 189 Thus, the court
refused to make assumptions about the market and about how the
defendant operated its business.
The plaintiff argued that the merger created a threat of monopolistic
behavior, and that “[t]he competitor of a monopolist always has standing
to challenge the monopolistic conduct forcing it from the market.” 190
The Fifth Circuit disagreed and, quoting Justice Stevens’ dissent in
Cargill, it would not issue an injunction upon the mere showing of “a
significant probability that the merger will adversely affect competition
in the market in which the plaintiff must compete.” 191 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that “the notion that merely facing the specter of a monopoly
is enough to create standing in a competitor is not the law.” 192
The Phototron court articulated a stringent approach to injunctions
under section 16 of the Clayton Act, requiring a substantial likelihood of
injury for an injunction to issue. 193 The Phototron rule, unlike the rule
in R.C. Bigelow, does not require the court to assume anything about the
defendant’s conduct after the transaction is consummated. This rule
eliminates many of the false positives that the R.C. Bigelow rule might

acquisition or maintenance of . . . power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”); United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 385 (1956) (“It could not be
said that this immense increase in use was solely or even largely attributable to the
superior quality of cellophane or to the technique or business acumen of du Pont . . . .”).
185. Phototron, 842 F.2d at 99.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 100 (“Phototron must present some evidence that Kodak or Colorcraft
has sold photofinishing services below its cost.”).
188. Id. at 99-100.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 100.
191. Id. (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 123 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 102 (“[C]ompetitors must now supply evidence of predatory behavior
demonstrating a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will be injured.”).
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enjoin, and when compared to the lax standard in R.C. Bigelow, reduces
the chilling effect on transactions in highly concentrated markets.
IV. TOWARDS A BETTER RULE
A. The Problem With Presumptions
The Atlantic Richfield decision brought the validity of the R.C.
Bigelow rule into question. 194 However, the precedent remains, standing
as an extreme pole for what is required to establish antitrust injury under
section 16 of the Clayton Act. 195 The broad proposition that “[m]arket
share data . . . constitutes sufficient evidence, in and of itself, of antitrust
injury to a competitor . . .” 196 seems to support the premise that a merger
that creates a large enough market share will be enjoined, regardless of
the economic effect.
This proposition causes several problems. The R.C. Bigelow rule
fails one of the most important purposes of the standing doctrine: to
distinguish between monopolistic and efficient actions. 197 If competitive
forces cause high market share, the plaintiffs would lack standing to
challenge the transaction. 198 Hence, the court in Atlantic Richfield
reasoned that “[i]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant
firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price
competition.” 199 The antitrust laws were not meant to discourage the
competitive conduct of larger entities. 200
R.C. Bigelow-like presumptions turn the standing doctrine of
antitrust injury on its head. To impute the harms of anticompetitive
conduct on firms of a particular size converts the antitrust injury
doctrine into an evaluation of the merits of the case. To decide that the
plaintiff will most likely engage in anticompetitive behavior, simply
194. See, e.g., Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1167
(W.D. Ark. 1995); Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 755 F. Supp 52, 5759 (D. Conn. 1991).
195. At the other extreme lies the Phototron rule requiring a substantial likelihood of
injury. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
196. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1989).
197. See Nostramo, supra note 151, at 178.
198. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88
(1977).
199. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 341 (1990) (quoting
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986)).
200. See id. at 340-41.
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because of its size, requires a court to decide an entire monopolization
case. A court must decide what the relevant market is, determine
whether any barriers to entry exist, and ascertain the likelihood that the
defendant will engage in anticompetitive conduct. 201 Standing, in large
part, depends on who brings the suit, rather than who is being sued. 202
The inquiry should be whether the individual bringing suit is sufficiently
endangered by the merger to be in a position to seek its injunction.
A merger’s purpose clearly affects whether the defendant faces any
threat of antitrust injury. Courts struggle to separate the notion of threat
from an evaluation of the merits of the case. 203 However, the focus of
the inquiry need not remain on the merits. Assuming that the doctrine is
a filter preventing the wrong plaintiff from bringing antitrust claims, 204
the proper time to evaluate the merits would be later in an antitrust
proceeding, when more market data can be ascertained.
To argue sufficient antitrust injury, one must show a violation of
the antitrust laws to be so probable that a specific antitrust injury is
bound to occur. 205 The analysis requires a showing of three elements:206
201. Such an inquiry is common to both monopolization claims and section 7 claims
alleging an anticompetitive merger. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
571 (1966) (noting that a product market must be defined in a monopolization claim by
including reasonable substitutes for a product); United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1956) (noting that market definition is a
precursor to a monopolization claim); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.11 (1997) (defining the relevant market in a
section 7 claim as one in which a party can impose a “small but significant and
nontransitory increase” in price).
202. The Supreme Court has focused on the plaintiff’s injury as opposed to the
defendant’s conduct. The Court also considers the ability to remedy the injury, the
causation between the injury and the violation of the antitrust laws, and whether the
plaintiff is the best party to sue for those injuries. See Associated Gen. Contractors of
Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-37 (1983).
203. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986).
204. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 536-37.
205. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986). In order
to determine whether a causal nexus exists between the alleged antitrust violation and
the alleged injury, courts do not address the probability of the plaintiff’s argument that
the antitrust laws have been violated. See id. One of the reasons why allegations of
predatory conduct are so problematic in the antitrust injury context is that predatory
schemes are rare and difficult to execute. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699
(“That predatory pricing seems highly unlikely does not necessarily mean that there
should be no antitrust rules against it. But it does suggest that extreme care be taken in
formulating such rules, lest the threat of litigation, particularly by private parties,
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(1) The antitrust laws must likely be violated should the transaction
occur, 207 or, in a section 7 case, that a merger is likely to create a
monopoly or lead to predatory pricing; 208 (2) The injury suffered must
be of the kind that the antitrust laws were meant to prevent; 209 (3)
Causation must exist between the injury and breach of the antitrust
laws. 210
To argue a causal nexus, one must speculate upon what the effects
of the merger would be, if consummated. 211 Granting an injunction
prior to the occurrence of a transaction 212 necessarily involves
speculation about the effects of the transaction and the prospective
application of the antitrust laws. 213 The R.C. Bigelow presumption,
however, requires a court to make too many unwarranted inferences. It
is one thing to conclude that an increase in price would be the natural
effect of a merger that creates a concentrated market; it is another to
assume that a merged entity would begin to charge monopoly rents or
engage in predatory pricing. Even if a price increase is likely, applying
the R.C. Bigelow presumption would require a court to assume that the
increase arises from a decrease in competition, which is not always the
case. 214 A court may speculate about the likely effects of the merger,
but cannot make assumptions that direct the inquiry one way or the
other. To do so would be to reduce the antitrust injury requirement to an
injury-in-fact requirement. 215
The two assumptions inherent in R.C. Bigelow analysis
demonstrates that such a rule erodes the causal nexus required to sustain

materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing.”); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89.
206. Cf. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 118-22.
207. See id.
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
209. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88
(1977).
210. See R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1989).
211. Cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (noting that a determination that a firm would
engage in predatory pricing is inherently speculative).
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. Prices can increase for a variety of reasons, such as an increase in the cost of
production, or the sudden loss of some market efficiencies.
215. Although both the injury-in-fact requirement and the antitrust injury
requirement require some form of causation and redress, the antitrust injury doctrine
requires causation to tether the injury to the purpose of the laws creating the cause of
action.
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an injunction. First, the court must assume that the merged entity will
increase prices or engage in predatory conduct. 216
Beneath a
presumption that the merged entity will increase prices is yet another
assumption that another firm will not simply lower its prices and capture
market share, or that another firm will not enter and compete with the
firm directly. 217 Specifically, a court must assume sufficient barriers to
entry into the relevant market exist to ensure that the merged company
can maintain its price increase. 218 In the alternative, the court must
assume that the market share left for competitors after the merger is
insufficient to maintain competitive forces. 219
For example, a
competitor with thirty percent of the market share can probably compete
with the merged company. Absent predatory pricing, the merged
company will be forced to keep pace with price competition. A market
share of ninety-five percent, however, will likely preclude the
competitor from directly competing with the merged company on
price. 220 Such a market share, however, will not preclude market entry
to capture the market share that the merged company loses when it
increases prices.
One must presuppose a lot about the relevant market to assume that
the merged company will increase prices. First, assumptions about the

216. See, e.g., R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 110 (2d Cir.
1989) (distinguishing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 (1989)).
217. Cf. Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 698-99 (“[A] firm can anticipate
monopoly profits for only so long as its monopoly prices do not attract new entry.”).
218. See id.
219. If demand is sufficiently high and the small share competitor has enough
capacity to meet a substantial portion of the outstanding demand, the competitor might
capture a larger share by producing more, bringing down the price of the good and
undermining the monopolist’s attempt to charge monopoly prices.
220. A 95% market share would make it difficult for a rival firm to compete on price
because it is unlikely that a newcomer can produce enough output to offset the price set
by the dominant firm. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119.
In order to succeed in a sustained campaign of predatory pricing, a predator must be
able to absorb the market shares of its rivals once prices have been cut. If it cannot do
so, its attempt at predation will presumably fail, because there will remain in the
market sufficient demand for the competitors’ goods at a higher price, and the
competitors will not be driven out of business.

Id. Even if the newcomer can produce adequate output to undercut the dominant firm,
the dominant firm’s prices, brand strength, consumer loyalty, and product innovation
may still pose a substantial barrier to price competition. Cf. United States v. Von’s
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 303 n.35 (1966) (noting that firms that fall below a 20%
market share may still be unlawful where serious barriers to entry exist).
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strength of barriers to entry or the durability of the competition speaks to
the merits of the case. 221 Showing that the market possesses sufficient
barriers to entry or that competition has been stifled goes to the heart of
the substantive claims. 222 Second, to assume predatory pricing, the court
must believe that the merged company can recoup its costs after it has
eliminated competition. 223 For a predatory pricing scheme to work,
there must not be a competitor in the relevant market that can sustain
predatory competition for a protracted period of time. 224 Additionally, at
some price point a product substitute might become more viable. 225 For
example, if widget A sells for $5 and widget B sells for $10, and both
widgets can be used for a similar purpose, a consumer may switch to
widget B if widget A increases in price to $10.50. 226 If the substitute
sells below the monopoly price, the merged company cannot charge
monopoly prices.
Some cases may present facts that warrant such assumptions, some
may not; therein lies the problem with the R.C. Bigelow presumption.
All mergers will be treated as pernicious mergers and will be enjoined if
they possess only one of the indicia of danger—market share
concentration. However, the ability to increase prices depends on both
market share and barriers to entry in the relevant market. To exclude
other factors by mechanically enjoining high market share transactions
would create too many false positives and chill high market share
mergers, regardless of their potential efficiencies.

221. Central to a claim of monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act is
whether barriers-to-entry exist in the relevant market. See United States v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 456 (1920).
222. See id.
223. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589
(1986) (“The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly
power for long enough both to recoup the predator’s losses and to harvest some
additional gain.”).
224. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 698 (“[A predator must have] greater
financial staying power than his rivals . . . .”).
225. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393
(1956) (“Determination of the competitive market for commodities depends on how
different from one another are the offered commodities in character or use, how far
buyers will go to substitute one commodity for another.”).
226. For example, in the du Pont case, the court noted that at some point users of
cellophane wrapping may switch to another cellulose-based wrapping material, or even
to tin foil, if the cost of cellophane becomes prohibitive. See id. at 400-01.
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B. Probability and Predation: Difficulties in Determining the
Likelihood of Predatory Pricing Before It Happens
A court might struggle to accurately predict whether a transaction
will give rise to predatory conduct, or even whether a transaction poses a
threat of such anticompetitive behavior. Many commentators have
expressed doubt as to the rationality of predatory pricing. 227 Even if one
were to concede that there might be some reason to engage in predatory
pricing, defining the conduct is itself an intractable problem. 228 Spotting
conduct that is improbable and difficult to define before it occurs must
necessarily be more difficult than identifying it after it occurs.
Two problems with predatory pricing appear when issuing an
injunction. First, it might never be worth it for a firm to engage in
predatory pricing. 229 Further, it might only be rational to engage in
predatory pricing if some rare market conditions exist. 230 Second,
defining what constitutes predatory pricing is problematic; 231 even the
straightforward definition of pricing below cost does not address which
cost to use. 232 Thus, it is difficult to identify predatory pricing once it
has occurred, let alone to determine whether predatory pricing will occur
if a transaction is consummated.
1. The Low Probability of Predation: Is Pricing Rational Conduct?
Ideally, a rule governing injunctive relief in antitrust cases should
reflect the probability of harm. 233 A rule that enjoins transactions in
227. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699 (“The prospects of an
adequate future payoff, therefore, will seldom be sufficient to motivate predation.
Indeed, proven cases of predatory pricing have been extremely rare.”); BORK, supra
note 39, at 144-55.
228. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
229. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58990 (1986).
230. K. Craig Wildfang, Predatory Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
Do Recent Cases Illuminate the Boundaries?, 31 J. CORP. L. 323, 327 (“[T]here is
general agreement with the conclusion that successful predatory pricing is a relatively
rare occurrence, and that there are relatively few markets in which the natural and
artificial entry barriers are great enough to sustain a sufficient recoupment period of
monopoly prices to warrant serious antitrust concern.”).
231. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
233. The standard test for injunctive relief examines both the magnitude of the harm
that will occur if the court refuses to enjoin certain conduct and the probability of the
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proportion to their probability of anticompetitive effect will yield the
fewest false positives. Thus, the probability of the conduct being
alleged should play a central role in a court’s antitrust inquiry. If a court
determines injunctive relief based on the probability of harm occurring,
then a predatory pricing claim should be difficult to enjoin. 234
The primary criticism of predatory pricing as rational economic
behavior is that success depends on a series of improbable events. 235 To
assume that a firm will engage in predatory conduct is not just to assume
the effects of such conduct, but the existence of other preconditions.236
The string of assumptions required to reach a conclusion of predatory
conduct has led courts to require “a dangerous probability of actual
monopolization” resulting from the alleged predation. 237 To assume that
a firm with market dominance will abuse its high market share and
engage in predation not only assumes that the firm is willing to do so,
but also that it is in a position to do so successfully.
Success, however, is often improbable. 238 To successfully drive a
competitor out of the market, a firm must be certain that it can recoup
the costs of predation. 239 It must recoup not only the amount below the
cost at which it sold its goods, but also the forgone profits. 240 During
the predation period, a firm undergoing such behavior must not only
manage to eliminate most of its competition, but must also erect

plaintiff succeeding on the merits of the case. See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of
America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003). Courts do this by examining the balance
of hardships, the irreparability of the harm, and its imminence. Id. A rule governing
antitrust injunctions should be no different. If a court presumes that a firm will engage
in improbable conduct, it is divorcing the injunctive relief analysis from its purpose—
protection against imminent and irreversible harm.
234. Although the probability of predation is slim, this does not mean there should
not be a rule prohibiting such conduct. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699.
The low probability, however, should counsel against assuming that it will occur in
most cases.
235. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58990 (1986).
236. For a firm to make predation work, the market must be such that the predator
can expect to recoup its costs. See id. at 589.
237. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
222 (1993) (quoting Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993)).
238. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589-90; Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699;
BORK, supra note 39, at 144-55.
239. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590.
240. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 698.
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sufficient barriers to entry to prevent a new competitor from moving into
the market and capturing market share. 241
Nevertheless, improbable does not mean impossible. 242 Some
commentators have noted circumstances in which predatory pricing
might be worthwhile, albeit difficult to execute. 243 While there may be
few rational economic reasons to engage in predation, there may be
some strategic reasons to do so. 244 A firm may choose to use predation
as a means of signaling to competitors in another market. 245 By
subjugating its competition in one market, a predator may be able to
create a fear of retaliation in another market, deterring its competitors
from engaging in aggressive competition. 246 If the net gain from
controlling the second market is greater than the loss sustained in the
first market, predatory conduct might not only be a feasible tactic, but a
rational one.
To fashion a rule that prevents predation where it is most probable,
a court may have to view predatory pricing as communication rather
than profit-maximizing behavior. 247 A show of force in one market to
subordinate competitors in another market is a prime example of
signaling. 248
Another potential motivation for signaling through
predation is to send competitors false messages. 249
A competitor may lower prices below its costs to create the illusion
that market conditions are unfavorable for entry. 250 Such signaling
assumes incomplete market information, such that competitors do not
have an accurate picture of market conditions in a market they have not

241.
242.
243.

See id. at 698-99.
See id. at 699.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 925, 939-42 (1979); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 89 HARV. L. REV. 868 (1976).
244. See Posner, supra note 244, at 939-40.
245. See id.
246. Id. at 940 (“If [a predator] sells below cost in one market, his losses there are an
investment that will be recouped with interest in his other markets in the form of more
timid competition from the rivals in those markets.”).
247. See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare
Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
248. Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2299-302 (2000).
249. “Cost signaling,” a common example, intentionally misrepresents market
conditions. See id. at 2248.
250. See id.
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yet entered. Inductively, one can assume that the plausibility of
predation as a signaling tactic depends largely on the amount of
information potential competitors have about the relevant market.
The two possible explanations for predatory conduct described
above can guide a rule for injunctions. First, a predator must be likely to
recoup its predation costs. 251 It can do so if it is either signaling to bar a
competitor from entering in order to achieve some profit-maximizing
end, or if it is likely to drive out competition from the relevant market
and erect the necessary barriers to entry to charge monopoly prices. For
a court to find that signaling is likely, it will examine, among other
things, the alleged predator’s incentives and its exposure to other
markets. The likelihood of gaining market share depends on whether the
predator has successfully driven competitors from the market in the past,
whether it is likely to be able to maintain monopoly prices long enough
to recoup its losses, and whether it can successfully deter competitors
from entering the market and engaging in price competition. 252
A court must consider all these factors prior to enjoining a
transaction. Having a high market share is a precondition to both
charging monopoly prices and to signaling, but it does not necessarily
guarantee that a firm will engage in predation for either purpose.
Maintaining congruence between the probability of injunctive relief and
the probability of anticompetitive effect requires a court to consider far
more than market share. The R.C. Bigelow rule is too mechanical to
condemn anticompetitive behavior while still fostering and preserving
competition. A presumption of antitrust injury based on a ridgid market
share will condemn anticompetitive and procompetitive behavior alike.
2. Problems Defining Predatory Pricing
Even post-merger it is difficult to determine if a merged company
has engaged in predatory pricing, since no clear definition of predatory
pricing exists. 253 The main determination courts must make is whether a
251. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58990 (1986).
252. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20 at 698-99.
253. The United States Courts of Appeals differ on what measure of cost should be
used to determine if a firm is engaging in predatory pricing. See Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 n.1 (1993) (noting the
disagreement among circuit courts over the appropriate measure of cost in predation
cases). The Supreme Court left this issue unresolved. See id.
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firm has engaged in pricing below costs. 254 Fixed costs remain constant
regardless of output, while variable costs increase or decrease with
changes in output. 255 To measure a firm’s costs for the purpose of
predation, the variable cost per increase in unit output, called the
marginal cost, 256 is the most important metric. 257 Typically, marginal
cost rises as a plant reaches capacity. 258
Measuring a firm’s marginal cost is difficult, so simply comparing
the price of goods to marginal cost becomes problematic. 259 While
using marginal cost as the benchmark for determining whether a firm
has engaged in predatory pricing would be ideal, it is difficult to
determine what it costs a firm to produce and sell its last unit of
goods. 260 Average variable cost, which is “the sum of all variable costs
divided by output,” is another option, but this metric is also imperfect. 261
Average variable cost will not reveal if the firm’s rationale for engaging
in predation is strategic, rather than purely economic.
Regardless of which definition of cost one adopts, the necessary
data to compute cost is often unavailable because the transaction has not
yet occurred. The costs of a merged company might be much lower than
the costs of each company by itself because the merger might have
created production efficiencies. 262 Therefore, absent data about what
costs will be after a merger, cost predictions may be inaccurate.
Determining whether a firm has engaged in predatory pricing when a
court has complete information is difficult enough; doing so while
speculating about a firm’s post-transaction costs risks inaccuracy.

254. Most scholars agree that predatory pricing is the pricing of goods below some
measure of cost. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699; Bravo & Siciliani,
supra note 20, at 258; Foer, supra note 20, at 1319 (“The illegal act of predatory pricing
is defined as setting one’s prices below an appropriate measure of cost, with the ability
to later raise prices sufficiently to recapture the investment made in below-cost
pricing.”).
255. Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 700.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 716-17.
260. See id. at 700-02.
261. See id. at 700.
262. A merger may yield benefits resulting from economies of scale in production,
or from joint marketing efforts by the individual firms. See F.M. SCHERER & D. ROSS,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 159-67 (Houghton
Mifflin 3d ed. 1990).
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A court will have to make potentially erroneous assumptions about
market conditions and about the efficiencies of the proposed transaction.
It will not only have to assume that a post-transaction entity can charge a
monopoly price, but that the data could support a finding of predatory or
monopoly pricing. In other words, the court must both make
assumptions about a firm’s costs and decide on a definition of cost,
without necessary market information.
One cannot decide whether a firm is signaling without
understanding a firm’s motives within the relevant market. To properly
signal to an adjacent market that the predator will not tolerate aggressive
price competition, competitors must know definitively that the predator
is selling goods below cost. Thus, the predator must not only price
below its costs, but below what the competitors believe to be the general
cost of doing business. Sometimes this cost can be difficult to
determine. Other times the cost will be readily ascertainable by the
competition because the price of raw materials may govern the ultimate
price of the good. Essentially, the purpose of the predatory conduct will
determine which metric of cost is appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision to grant injunctive relief is a difficult one because a
court has little choice but to speculate about what would happen if it
does not act. Often, the line between legal and illegal conduct in
antitrust law is a thin one. A high market share may mean that a firm is
operating at levels of efficiency at which its competition cannot
compete, or it may mean that it has a superior product. It can also mean
that the firm is in a position to abuse its power over the market to secure
a dominant position and charge monopoly prices. Before a merger or
any affirmative conduct by the dominant firm, a court only has the
market share and other concentration metrics, such as the HerfindahlHirschman Index, upon which to rely. 263 These metrics are often
263. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a quantitative means of calculating market
concentration. It is obtained by adding the square of all the market shares in a relevant
product market. See Ark. Elec. Energy Consumers v. F.E.R.C., 290 F.3d 362, 370 n.6
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index refers to a measurement of market
concentration that ‘is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares
of all the participants.’” (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1997))). Courts will sometimes rely on the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to determine how many competitors make up the majority
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indeterminate and agnostic about whether a firm is likely to employ
anticompetitive tactics.
A rule like that in R.C. Bigelow enjoins a transaction based on the
market share and concentration metrics alone. As a result, the antitrust
injury requirement is effectively reduced to an injury-in-fact
requirement. The doctrine can no longer function as a parsing
mechanism, separating perniciously dominant positions from benign
ones. By presuming the existence of antitrust injury, a court must
presume quite a bit about the market the firm is in, and the effect on the
market after the transaction is consummated. A court must assume that
a firm can recoup its losses, erect sufficient barriers to entry, and engage
in price competition. If a firm cannot seal off the market, it cannot
recoup its losses by charging monopoly prices.
The most problematic assumption that a court can make is that a
firm will engage in predatory pricing once it has secured a dominant
position in the market. Predatory pricing is highly unlikely to occur
because it is a difficult tactic to pull off. Not only must a firm recoup its
losses from pricing goods below its costs, it must also have the staying
power to outlast its competition. Even in cases in which a firm may be
using the predatory conduct as a signaling mechanism, it is incredibly
difficult to define and identify predatory pricing, particularly when it has
not yet happened.
A more defensible approach to antitrust injury will make as few
presumptions as possible. The most proactive method of avoiding
unwarranted assumptions about a firm and the market is to avoid
mechanical antitrust injury rules. In particular, a court should never
presume the existence of antitrust injury and should always examine the
causal nexus between the purposes of the antitrust laws and the injury
asserted rather carefully. There is no substitute for carefully examining
the injury and the likelihood that the injury was caused by something the
antitrust laws were meant to prevent. A mechanical condemnation of
high market share mergers by injunction cannot succeed. Such a rule
risks discouraging innovation and stifling merger activity.

of the relevant market. See id. at 369-70.

